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INEFFECTIVE BY DESIGN: A CRITIQUE OF CAMPAIGN 
FINANCE LAW ENFORCEMENT IN THE UNITED 
STATES, AUSTRALIA, AND THE UNITED KINGDOM 
 
Kelly Ann Skahan† 
 
Abstract:  Though ostensibly tasked with enforcing their respective nations’ 
campaign finance laws, the Federal Election Commission (“FEC”), Australian Electoral 
Commission (“AEC”), and Electoral Commission (“EC”) are woefully unable to 
meaningfully address the evolving nature of campaigns or enforce existing regulations in 
the United States, Australia, and the United Kingdom, respectively.  Attempts at 
enforcement are cut off at the knees by political infighting, half-hearted grants of 
independent authority, and a lack of institutional support.  Conversely, the New York 
City Campaign Finance Board (“CFB”) is recognized as an example of meaningful 
enforcement and relative political independence.  By implementing changes that translate 
the CFB’s municipally-successful structure to federal agencies, the FEC, AEC and EC 
could become more effective in the enforcement of existing laws and better at adapting to 
the changing face of elections. 
 
Cite as:  Kelly Ann Skahan, Ineffective By Design: A Critique of Campaign Finance Law 
Enforcement in the United States, Australia, and the United Kingdom, 27 WASH. INT'L 
L.J. 577 (2018).  
 
I. INTRODUCTION  
 
In modern democracies, it takes money to run an election campaign 
and laws to make sure a campaign is run fairly.  Those laws are tested often.  
Imagine:  in one country, a government body receives five separate reports, 
each alleging that political action committees have created shell companies 
from which wealthy donors can contribute unlimited funds to their chosen 
candidates—an illegal act.1  Across the Atlantic, the political party in power 
egregiously oversteps long-established candidate spending limits in over two 
dozen constituencies en route to a decisive electoral victory.2  A hemisphere 
away, a Senator transfers funds from his labor union’s accounts to his own 
                                                     
† Kelly Ann Skahan is a J.D. Candidate at the University of Washington and is expected to graduate 
in June 2018.  The author received a B.A. in English from Villanova University. She would like to thank 
Professor Lisa Marshall Manheim for her guidance and patience, the staff of the Washington International 
Law Journal for their hard work, Vince Skahan for the history lessons, and Susan Skahan for everything. 
1  OFFICE OF COMM’R ANN M.  RAVEL, FED. ELECTION COMM’N, DYSFUNCTION AND DEADLOCK: 
THE ENFORCEMENT CRISIS AT THE FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION REVEALS THE 
UNLIKELIHOOD OF DRAINING THE SWAMP 14 (2017), https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/3474279
/Ravelreport-feb2017.pdf. 
2  Martin Belam, What is the Tory election expenses story and why isn’t it bigger news?, GUARDIAN 
(May 13, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/may/13/tory-election-expenses.   
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campaign war chest, disclosing the donation fourteen months after he is 
reelected—a full eight months after the law required him to do so.3  The 
violations are not related, the beneficiaries are of different political 
ideologies, and they are located thousands of miles apart.  The common 
thread in each corner of the globe:  the bodies tasked with stopping 
violations of campaign finance law do nothing in response. 
 
Though similar in governmental structure and lawmaking procedure,4 
the United States, Australia, and the United Kingdom each approach 
campaign finance laws differently.  Disclosure thresholds, 5  contribution 
limits,6 foreign contributions,7 and the role of public financing8 vary widely 
among the three countries.  However, they share a common theme:  all three 
countries’ campaign finance laws are ineffective because they fail to 
empower their respective campaign finance boards to meaningfully enforce 
those laws.  Specifically, political infighting paralyzes the United States’ 
Federal Election Commission (“FEC”), the Australian Electoral Commission 
(“AEC”) fails to effectively monitor violations of campaign finance law, and 
the insufficiently harsh penalties of the Electoral Commission (“EC”) fail to 
deter the United Kingdom’s political parties from overstepping spending 
limits. 
 
Part I of this Comment examines the establishment, authority, and 
structure of the campaign finance law enforcement bodies of the United 
States, Australia, and the United Kingdom—the FEC, the AEC, and the EC, 
                                                     
3  Daniel Hurst, Bill Shorten quizzed over late disclosure of $75,000 in campaign support, 
GUARDIAN (July 8, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2015/jul/08/bill-shorten-2007-
donation-declaration-updated-within-last-144-hours. 
4  John Kilcullen, A comparison of Australian, British, Canadian and US political systems, 
MACQUARIE U. DEP’T OF MOD. HIST. POL. & INT’L REL., http://www.mq.edu.au/about_us/faculties_and_ 
departments/faculty_of_arts/mhpir/staff/staff-politics_and_international_relations/john_kilcullen/ 
a_comparison_of_australian_british_canadian_and_us_political_systems/ (last visited Sept. 30, 2017). 
5  Andrew Gibbons, Show us the money: It’s time to fix Australia’s broken campaign financing 
system, MELB. SCH. OF GOV’T: ELECTION WATCH – AUSTL. 2016, 
http://electionwatch.unimelb.edu.au/australia-2016/articles/show-us-the-money (last visited July 15, 2017).    
6  Nick Thompson, International campaign finance: How do countries compare?, CNN (Mar. 5, 
2012), http://www.cnn.com/2012/01/24/world/global-campaign-finance/index.html (“[T]he absence of 
limits on the amount individuals or corporations can donate has contributed to the ongoing erosion of 
public confidence in the political process in the UK, according to one watchdog organization.”).   
7  Damien Cave & Jacqueline Williams, Australian Politics Is Open to Foreign Cash, and China 
Has Much to Gain, N.Y. TIMES (June 6, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/06/world/australia/china-political-influence-campaign-
finance.html?_r=0.   
8  See generally Public funding for parties, THE ELECTORAL COMM’N, 
https://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/find-information-by-subject/political-parties-campaigning-and-
donations/public-funding-for-parties (last visited July 15, 2017).   
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respectively.  It also discusses instances in which each body failed to enforce 
clear violations of campaign finance law in their respective jurisdictions.  
Part II examines the establishment, authority, and structure of the New York 
City Campaign Finance Board (“CFB”), known widely as one of the most 
effective campaign finance law enforcement bodies in operation today,9 as 
well as an example of effective enforcement on the part of the CFB.  Part III 
evaluates the FEC, AEC, and EC using five factors that make for effective 
enforcement, based on the New York City CFB’s structure.  Part IV and 
finally, this Comment addresses the limits and challenges of applying 
measures that succeed on the municipal level to a national enforcement 
body. 
 
II. THE FEC, AEC, AND EC 
 
The United States’ Federal Election Commission, the Australian 
Electoral Commission, and the United Kingdom’s Electoral Commission are 
each structured differently, with varying jurisdictions and responsibilities.  
However, each body is ineffective because none can effectively enforce the 
laws they ostensibly exist to maintain, develop, and impose.  Specifically, 
the FEC is crippled by deadlocked votes and consequent inaction, the AEC 
fails to effectively monitor and audit campaign finance violations in the first 
place, and the EC lacks authority to impose substantial penalties even when 
significant violations occur. 
 
A. The United States’ Federal Election Commission 
 
The United States’ history of campaign finance regulation began in 
1907.  President Roosevelt’s push for campaign finance reform led Congress 
to enact the Tillman Act, which banned corporate contributions to political 
candidates.10  Regulation continued through the first half of the twentieth 
century with the adoption of the Federal Corrupt Practice Act and its 
amendments, the Hatch Act, the Smith-Connally Act, and the Taft-Hartley 
Act, each seeking to rein in corporate and union contributions to election 
campaigns.11 
                                                     
9  Jack Noland, How to Effectively Enforce Campaign Finance Laws, ISSUE ONE (Dec. 4, 2015), 
https://www.issueone.org/how-to-effectively-enforce-campaign-finance-laws/ (“One reason why [New 
York City’s campaign finance system] has been so successful is because it is backed by an effective 
enforcement agency.”). 
10  Appendix 4: Federal Election Campaign Laws: A Short History, FED. ELECTION COMM’N, 
https://transition.fec.gov/info/appfour.htm (last visited Sept. 30, 2017). 
11  Id. 
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In 1971, the United States Congress passed the Federal Election 
Campaign Act (“FECA”), “instituting more stringent disclosure 
requirements for federal candidates, political parties, and political action 
committees.”12  Three years later, in response to the Watergate scandal and 
the 1972 presidential election, Congress passed amendments to the law that 
set limits on contributions by individuals, political parties, and political 
action committees.  The amendments consolidated previously-passed 
campaign finance restrictions and formed a comprehensive system of 
regulation, enforcement, and reporting requirements for federal elections.13  
The amendments also established the FEC as an independent agency 
designed to regulate campaign finance, collect disclosed finance 
information, enforce civil penalties, and oversee public funding of 
presidential elections.14 
 
The FEC consists of six commissioners, no more than three of whom 
can represent the same political party.15  Generally, commissioners “serve in 
staggered six-year terms,”16 with two seats up for appointment every two 
years and the chair of the Commission seat changing annually.17  When no 
successor is appointed, a commissioner may serve beyond her six-year term; 
though each commissioner theoretically serves as chair only once, 
commissioners who serve beyond their six-year term may become chair 
more than one time.18 
 
Recently, those appointments have been waylaid by political 
infighting during the approval process.  In 2008, for instance, only two 
commissioners remained on the job when Senator Mitch McConnell 
“demanded that the Senate vote on pending nominees as a package, not 
individually,” leaving all but two seats open on the Commission.19  Four 
commissioners must agree for any official Commission action to occur;20 
                                                     
12  Mission and History, FED. ELECTION COMM’N, https://www.fec.gov/about/mission-and-history/ 
(last visited July 15, 2017). 
13  Id. 
14  Id. 
15  Leadership and Structure, FED. ELECTION COMM’N, https://www.fec.gov/about/leadership-and-
structure/ (last visited July 15, 2017). 
16  Id. 
17  Id. 
18  See, e.g., Ellen L. Weintraub, FED. ELECTION COMM’N, https://www.fec.gov/about/leadership-and-
structure/ellen-l-weintraub/ (last visited July 16, 2017). 
19  Dave Levinthal, Another Massive Problem With U.S. Democracy: The FEC Is Broken, ATLANTIC 
(Dec. 17, 2013), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2013/12/another-massive-problem-with-us-
democracy-the-fec-is-broken/282404/. 
20  Leadership and Structure, supra note 15. 
April 2018  Ineffective by Design  
 
581
consequently, if the Commission has open seats, it is difficult to obtain 
approval of any proposed official action.21  In 2008, four open seats all but 
paralyzed the Commission entirely.22 
 
Open seats and a lack of consensus led to a steep rise in deadlocked 
votes and a corresponding drop in official action by the Commission.  In 
2007, only seven percent of votes “failed to reach the four-vote threshold” 
necessary for approval.23  After Republican Don McGahn’s appointment to 
the Commission in 2008, that number climbed to thirty-two percent; by 2013 
it had reached forty-one percent. 24   Consequently, fines imposed for 
campaign finance violations dropped.  The FEC assessed more than $6.7 
million in fines in 2006, but in 2012 that number dropped to less than $1 
million.25  In addition, the processing of cases slowed.  While the FEC aims 
to process cases within fifteen months of receiving them, it only managed to 
do so seventy percent of the time.  Alternative dispute resolutions also took 
longer to assign, and though the Commission “aimed to conclude all non-
presidential audits [of campaigns] in an average of 10 months after the 
election . . . it hit that benchmark just 27 percent of the time.”26 
 
The FEC’s power to enforce law is also statutorily limited.27  “The 
FEC has exclusive jurisdiction over the civil enforcement of federal 
campaign finance law”; 28  criminal prosecution, however, is the 
responsibility of the Department of Justice.29  The Commission also has the 
power to interpret the FECA through regulations and advisory opinions,30 
                                                     
21  Some argue that this gridlock was by design.  “‘Congress created the agency to be structurally 
deadlocked,’ said Ralph Nader .  .  .  ‘Congress is content to defer to the FEC’s paralysis. It never wanted 
an agency that would pinch both parties.’” Levinthal, supra note 19; see also Eric Lichtblau, F.E.C.  Can’t 
Curb 2016 Election Abuse, Commission Chief Says, N.Y. TIMES (May 2, 2015), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/03/us/politics/fec-cant-curb-2016-election-abuse-commission-chief-
says.html (“‘Congress set this place up to gridlock,’ Lee E. Goodman, a Republican commissioner, said in 
an interview.  ‘This agency is functioning as Congress intended.’”). 
22  Levinthal, supra note 19. 
23  Id. 
24  Id. 
25  Id. 
26  Id. 
27  52 U.S.C. § 30105 (2014). 
28  Enforcing federal campaign finance law, FED. ELECTION COMM’N, https://www.fec.gov/legal-
resources/enforcement/ (last visited July 16, 2017). 
29  CRAIG C. DONSANTO & NANCY L. SIMMONS, FEDERAL PROSECUTION OF ELECTION OFFENSES 198 
(7th ed. 2007) (ebook), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/criminal/legacy/2013/09/30/electbook-
0507.pdf. 
30  2 U.S.C. § 437(c)(b)(1); 2 U.S.C. § 437(d)(a)(7); 2 U.S.C. § 437(d)(a)(8); 2 U.S.C. § 437(d)(3); 2 
U.S.C. § 437(f); see generally Rebecca Curry, Making Law with Lawsuits: Understanding Judicial Review 
in Campaign Finance Policy, 46 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 389 (2013). 
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though a majority of commissioners must agree before the FEC may issue 
any regulation or opinion. 
 
The agency’s civil enforcement cases come from four sources:  audits 
of political action committees’ reports, complaints, referrals from other 
government agencies, and self-submissions from individuals or entities who 
believe they have committed a violation.31  Enforcement cases are known as 
matters under review (“MURs”).  Less complicated matters may be referred 
to either an alternative dispute resolution program or the Commission’s 
Administrative Fines Program, which calculates pre-established fines for 
routine violations like late or missing disclosure documents.32 
 
Enforcement cases are usually triggered by a complaint or internal 
referral.  The Commission’s Office of General Counsel then reviews the 
submitted materials and recommends a response to the Commission.33  If 
four commissioners agree there is reason to believe a violation occurred or is 
about to occur, the Commission can open an investigation, open settlement 
negotiations, or file a lawsuit if no alternative resolution is possible.34 
 
The FEC’s susceptibility to deadlocks and stagnation is particularly 
evident in recent United States Supreme Court decisions.  Although the 
Supreme Court emphasized the importance of disclosure, particularly with 
regard to corporate contributions, in its 2010 decision in Citizens United,35 
the FEC has yet to respond by issuing disclosure rules that take corporate 
contributions into account. 36   Rather, the Commission has delayed 
consideration, abstained, or voted against the Office of General Counsel’s 
recommendation to investigate donations that were either improperly 
disclosed or undisclosed entirely.  Commissioner Ann Ravel detailed those 
MURs in the report she issued upon her departure.37  She remarked that she, 
along with Commissioners Weintraub and Walther, made over ten motions to 
                                                     
31  Enforcing federal campaign finance law, supra note 28. 
32  RAVEL, supra note 1, at 6. 
33  Id. 
34  Id. 
35  Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 370 (2010) (“A campaign finance system 
that pairs corporate independent expenditures with effective disclosure has not existed before today.  It 
must be noted, furthermore, that many of Congress’ findings in passing BCRA were premised on a system 
without adequate disclosure .  .  .  .  With the advent of the Internet, prompt disclosure of expenditures can 
provide shareholders and citizens with the information needed to hold corporations and elected officials 
accountable for their positions and supporters.”). 
36  RAVEL, supra note 1, at 13. 
37  Id. at 14. 
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begin proceedings on allegations of improper disclosures after the Office of 
General Counsel recommended opening an investigation, but no member of 
the Republican bloc was willing to join them.  Deadlocked, the Commission 
ultimately did nothing to address the complaints.38 
 
B. The Australian Electoral Commission 
 
Established in 1984,39 the AEC is officially a three-person body; it 
includes a chairperson, an electoral commissioner, and a non-judicial 
member.40   However, the three members are not identically powerful or 
credentialed, and they do not vote on issues in the same way as their 
counterparts in the United States.  The chairperson must be a judge or retired 
judge of the Australian Federal Court. 41   The electoral commissioner is 
considered the chief executive officer of the Commission,42 and only his or 
her position is full-time; the chairperson and non-judicial member hold their 
offices on a part-time basis. 43   All three are appointed by Australia’s 
governor-general.44  The commissioners hold office for up to seven years 
and are eligible for reappointment.45  A quorum requires two members of the 
Commission.46 
 
Structurally, the AEC is quite different from the FEC.  Rather than a 
single centralized office and commission, the AEC has a three-tiered 
structure; the agency is comprised of a national office in Canberra, state and 
territory offices in each state’s capital, and 150 divisional offices throughout 
the country tasked with managing the Commission’s diverse portfolio of 
responsibilities.47  Electoral officers for the states are appointed directly by 
the three commissioners,48 and staff may be hired by the Commission as 
needed.49 
 
                                                     
38  Id. 
39  AEC organisational structure, AUSTL. ELECTORAL COMM’N (Dec. 8, 2017), 
http://www.aec.gov.au/About_AEC/structure.htm. 
40  Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 sub-div 6(2) (Engl.). 
41  Id. at sub-div 6(4). 
42  Id. at sub-div 18(2). 
43  Id. at sub-div 6(3). 
44  Id. at sub-divs 6(3)–(4). 
45  Id. at sub-div 8(1). 
46  Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 sub-div 15(3) (Austl.). 
47  AEC organisational structure, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined.. 
48  Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 sub-div 31(1) (Austl.). 
49  Id. at sub-divs 35(1)–(2). 
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The AEC’s jurisdiction is also different from that of its American 
equivalent in several ways.  Though both are independent agencies, the AEC 
is primarily responsible for actually executing elections, including 
establishing seat boundaries, redistributing districts, and maintaining voter 
rolls.50  Statutorily, the AEC is responsible for considering and reporting to 
the prime minister on electoral matters, promoting public awareness of 
electoral matters, providing information and advice on electoral matters to 
the government, conducting research on electoral matters, publishing on 
matters related to elections, and providing assistance in matters relating to 
foreign elections.51 
 
Though the AEC’s jurisdiction does include campaign finance, the 
Commission’s actual involvement with enforcement is limited; 
consequently, violations of campaign finance law often go unnoticed.  When 
campaigns violate disclosure limits or accept illegal loans, the electoral 
commissioner may bring an action in court against the candidate or an agent 
of the party in violation.52  The AEC may also authorize investigation into 
potential violations, requiring a candidate or party agent to produce 
documents or appear for questioning.53  If the AEC finds a campaign has 
violated the law, the Commission may refer the case to the relevant state or 
territory office of the Commonwealth Directorate of Public Prosecutions 
(“DPP”).  It is within the DPP’s discretion whether to pursue the matter 
further. 54   However, although the AEC is statutorily empowered to 
investigate violations, the Commission’s jurisdiction is so broad that it often 
fails to notice when a party files late disclosure statements or fails to file 
them entirely.55 
 
The AEC is more reticent about regulating campaigns and campaign 
finance activity than the FEC.  The agency’s 2016–2020 corporate plan 
includes language stating “[a]s a regulatory body, the AEC aims to reduce 
                                                     
50  Functions of the AEC, AUSTL. ELECTORAL COMM’N (Sept. 22, 2017), 
http://www.aec.gov.au/About_AEC/AEC_Services/. 
51  Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 sub-divs 7(1)–(3) (Austl.). 
52  Id. at sub-divs 315A(1)–(3). 
53  Id. at sub-div 316(2A). 
54  Bob Burton, What happens if a major political donor doesn’t disclose?, TASMANIAN TIMES (Oct. 
30, 2015), http://www.tasmaniantimes.com/index.php/article/what-happens-if-a-major-political-donor-
doesnt-disclose. 
55  Id. Additionally, online advertising generally falls into a gap between laws, where no Australian 
enforcement body is tasked with monitoring campaign finance or electioneering violations that take place 
on the internet.  See Sarah Collerton, Pollies slip through web ad loophole, ABC (Aug. 18, 2010), 
http://www.abc.net.au/news/2010-08-19/pollies-slip-through-web-ad-loophole/950402. 
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the regulatory burden imposed on electors through enrollment and voting 
activities,”56 before laying out a framework for assessing the performance of 
regulators.  Satisfactory performance by a regulator, the AEC explains, 
includes refraining from unnecessarily impeding efficient operation of 
regulated entities, using clear communication, proportionately responding to 
regulatory risk, dealing transparently, and streamlining monitoring 
programs57—essentially, getting out of the way of campaigns rather than 
actually regulating them. 
 
Public trust in the AEC faltered after Australia’s 2013 federal election, 
when the Commission referred over 8000 instances of multiple votes by the 
same voter to the Australian Federal Police,58 implying that the AEC had 
managed the election ineffectively.  In response, the AEC instituted its 
2016–2020 corporate plan, which identified five key “areas for 
improvement”: a changed model for electoral events, improved quality and 
assurance, professionalization of the AEC’s workforce, re-establishment of 
the agency’s reputation, and more agility and responsiveness across the 
agency.59 
 
The AEC, however, falls victim to many of the same pitfalls as its 
American equivalent.  Australia’s Commission faces much of the same 
partisan gridlock that cripples the United States’ enforcement body.  Major 
political parties in Australia are unwilling to rework campaign finance laws, 
which are inconsistent from state to state and often conflict with the general 
federal regime.60  Although federal law sets a donation disclosure limit of 
$13000, states have set inconsistent disclosure limits beneath this ceiling.61  
Further, disclosed donations are published six months after an election 
concludes, limiting the usefulness of disclosure.62 
 
                                                     
56  AUSTL. ELECTORAL COMM’N, AUSTRALIAN ELECTORAL COMMISSION CORPORATE PLAN 15 
(2016), http://www.aec.gov.au/About_AEC/Publications/corporate-plan/files/aec-corporate-plan-2016-
20.pdf [hereinafter AEC CORPORATE PLAN]. 
57  Id. 
58  Matthew Knott, AFP to investigate thousands of cases of multiple voting in 2013 election, 
SYDNEY MORNING HERALD (May 30, 2014), http://www.smh.com.au/federal-politics/political-news/afp-to-
investigate-thousands-of-cases-of-multiple-voting-in-2013-election-20140529-397wp.html. 
59  AEC CORPORATE PLAN, supra note 56, at 5. 
60  Anne Davies, Australia’s flawed political donations laws, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD (July 27, 
2015), http://www.smh.com.au/federal-politics/political-news/australias-flawed-political-donations-laws-
20150724-gijlll.html. 
61  Id. 
62  Id. 
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Ultimately, the AEC is tasked with too wide a jurisdiction and is 
encumbered by too few enforcement powers for it to effectively penalize 
even widely-known violations.  When legislative commission hearings 
reveal campaign finance violations, the AEC fails to act. 63   In 2017, 
Australian Labour Party leader Bill Shorten was scrutinized for 
overpayments made by his labor union to his campaign in 2007.  The 
payments were discovered when it came to light that the union had disclosed 
the contribution to the AEC a full fourteen months after the 2007 election.64  
Despite discovering this violation more than ten years ago, the AEC has yet 
to take any action regarding the offense, focusing instead on reorganizing its 
corporate structure and attempting to rehabilitate its own reputation. 
 
C. The United Kingdom’s Electoral Commission 
 
The United Kingdom’s EC was created in 1997, much later than its 
counterparts in the United States and Australia.  The EC was established by 
the Political Parties, Elections, and Referendums Act (“PPERA”), which 
also set limits on the amounts registered political parties could accept from 
donors and the amounts those parties could spend leading up to those 
elections. 65   Though originally tasked with overseeing and promoting 
elections and campaigns in the UK, the Commission gained more power in 
2006 when Parliament passed the Electoral Administration Act.  This Act 
required local authorities to review and report all polling stations to the 
Commission.66  In 2009, Parliament’s Political Parties and Elections Act 
expanded those powers again, instituting a wider range of civil sanctions that 
the Commission could impose on violators.67 
 
The EC’s current jurisdiction includes overseeing elections and 
regulating campaign finance throughout the UK.  The agency is divided into 
four main offices:  Communications and Research, Electoral Administration 
and Guidance, Finance and Corporate Services, and Political Finance and 
Regulation.68 
 
                                                     
63  Id. 
64  Brad Norington, Shorten donated AWU funds to his own campaign, AUSTRALIAN (Aug. 17, 2017), 
http://www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/industrial-relations/shorten-donated-awu-funds-to-his-
political-campaign/news-story/5ebf5e2436581d96585c2c7f509c87b7. 
65  Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000, c. 41 at § 18 (Eng.). 
66  Electoral Administration Act 2006, c. 22 (JDXN?). 
67  Political Parties and Elections Act 2009, c. 12, § 1(3) (Eng.). 
68  Who we are, ELECTORAL COMM’N, https://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/our-work/who-we-
are (last visited July 20, 2017). 
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The Commission itself has nine or ten commissioners who are 
independent of political parties.69  Commissioners may not be members or 
officers of a registered party; hold relevant elected office; or have been 
employed by a party, served in office, or been named as a donor to a party at 
any point in the past five years.70  Up to four of the ten commissioners are 
nominated by registered parties of Parliament.71  Each party may nominate 
up to three commissioners, and no more than two ultimately appointed 
commissioners may have been nominated by the same party. 72   The 
Commission also includes an Executive Team and a Senior Leadership 
group, who support the Commission “by providing day-to-day leadership to 
implement [its] strategy successfully.”73  These teams function largely in the 
same way as staff members of the FEC and AEC. 
 
The Commission’s statutory enforcement responsibilities come from 
the PPERA, which requires the agency to “monitor and take all reasonable 
steps to secure compliance with” campaign finance law.74  As the regulator 
of campaign finance, the EC “make[s] sure people understand the rules and 
tr[ies] to prevent people breaking the rules, [is] able to investigate and 
impose sanctions when people do break the rules, [and] publish[es] data on 
political funding and spending.” 75   The Commission also advises the 
government on proposed changes to campaign finance rules.76 
 
The EC learns about potential campaign finance violations either 
through its own independent monitoring, complaints made by individuals, 
press reports, or referrals from other regulators. 77   The Commission 
“check[s] all potential breaches of the PPERA rules to determine if they 
                                                     
69  The Commissioners, ELECTORAL COMM’N, https://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/our-
work/who-we-are/the-commissioners (last visited July 20, 2017). 
70  Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000, c.41, § 3(4)(a)–(d) (Eng.). 
71  Id. at § 3A(1). 
72  Id. at § 3A(5). The Queen nominally makes all appointments, but generally with the advice of 
Parliament. Id. at cf.(1)(4). 
73  Executive Team and Senior Leadership Group, ELECTORAL 
COMM’N, https://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/our-work/who-we-are/executive-and-management-team 
(last visited July 20, 2017). 
74  Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000, c.  41, § 145 (Eng.). 
75  Our role as regulator of political party finances, ELECTORAL 
COMM’N, https://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/our-work/roles-and-responsibilities/our-role-as-
regulator-of-political-party-finances (last visited July 20, 2017). 
76  Id. 
77  ELECTORAL COMM’N, ENFORCEMENT POLICY 12 (2016), 
https://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0011/199703/April-2016-Enforcement-
Policy.pdf [hereinafter EC ENFORCEMENT POLICY]. 
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should be assessed.” 78   If the Commission finds reasonable grounds to 
suspect an offense, it may open an investigation.79  However, before actually 
opening an investigation, the EC weighs “whether or not a matter is in the 
public interest and justifies the use of [its] resources,”80 considering factors 
like the seriousness of the offense, the strength of the evidence, the duration 
of the suspected offense, the compliance history of the person who may have 
committed the offense, and any steps already taken to rectify the breach.81 
 
Investigations have three possible outcomes:  a determination that 
there is not enough evidence of an offense to take action, the Commission’s 
satisfaction beyond a reasonable doubt that an offense has been committed, 
or the Commission’s decision that it is no longer in the public interest to 
investigate a suspected offense. 82   When the EC is satisfied beyond a 
reasonable doubt that an offense occurred, it decides whether to impose a 
sanction and refers the matter to the police, if appropriate.83 
 
Generally, the EC imposes sanctions where it considers it appropriate, 
proportionate, and in the public interest.84  When determining the size of a 
sanction, the Commission weighs a number of factors:  the seriousness of the 
offense, the harm caused, any financial gain or advantage the beneficiary 
may have received, whether the offense was inadvertent or deliberate, 
offenders’ cooperation with the investigation, whether the matter was 
reported voluntarily, efforts to mitigate the offense’s impact, and efforts 
taken to reduce the likelihood of recurrence. 85   Offenders are given the 
opportunity to respond to sanctions, and their appeals are heard by a member 
of the Commission.86 
 
In contrast with the United States and Australia, the United Kingdom’s 
campaign finance laws focus on limiting the expenditures made by 
candidates rather than limiting the donations that parties and individuals can 
receive.87  There are no limits on the amounts political parties or electoral 
                                                     
78  Id. 
79  Id. at 13. 
80  Id. 
81  Id. 
82  Id. at 14. 
83  EC ENFORCEMENT POLICY, supra note 77, at 15.  
84  Id. at 16. 
85  Id.  at 17. 
86  Id.  at 18. 
87  Campaign Finance: United Kingdom, LIBR. OF CONG., https://www.loc.gov/law/help/campaign-
finance/uk.php (last visited July 15, 2017). 
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candidates may receive;88 however, parties are obligated to report donations 
of over £5000 to the EC each year, and individual candidates must submit a 
return detailing donations of £50 or more.89  Donations of over £50 must 
come from permissible donors—that is, individuals registered on a UK 
electoral register, UK-registered political parties, or UK-registered 
companies, trade unions, building societies, or unincorporated associations.  
Foreign donors are not considered to be permissible donors.90  The EC is 
empowered to “seek forfeiture orders in the courts to recover from political 
parties the value of donations” it believes to be impermissible.91  Spending 
limits on electoral expenses are set through secondary legislation by the 
UK’s secretary of state, and only change upon recommendation from the EC 
or when the secretary of state deems it appropriate.92 
 
The EC is also empowered to impose civil penalties.  For offenses 
with fixed penalties, the Commission imposes a fine of £200.93  Failure to 
pay the fine within two weeks of the deadline triggers criminal penalties.94  
For offenses with discretionary penalties, the Commission calculates the 
amount of the fine according to the nature of the offense, taking into account 
the same factors considered when choosing whether to sanction a party in 
the first place.95  Penalties may be between £250 and £20000 for individual 
offenses.96 
 
The Commission also has the power to impose compliance notices 
and restoration notices, comparable to injunctive relief and restitution in the 
United States.97  The EC can impose compliance and restoration notices 
alone or in combination with discretionary penalties and aims to “restore the 
position [of the campaign], as far as possible, to what it would have been 
had no breach occurred.”98 
 
                                                     
88  Id. 
89  Id. 
90  Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000, c. 41, § 54 (Eng.) 
91  Id. at § 58. 
92  Campaign Finance: United Kingdom, supra note 87. 
93  EC ENFORCEMENT POLICY, supra note 77, at 19. 
94  Id.at 19–20. 
95  Id. at 20. 
96  Id. 
97  Id. at 21. 
98  Id.   
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Finally, the Commission may impose a forfeiture of funds.99  When a 
donation is not permissible, the EC can seek the forfeiture of some or all of 
the donation, at which point the donated money is given to the public purse.  
Though the Commission has the power to seek a forfeiture order through 
court proceedings, it usually achieves forfeiture through an agreement with 
the person or organization who accepted the donation.100 
 
The EC does not impose criminal penalties, and the Commission 
generally does not conduct investigations for offenses where only criminal 
prosecution is available.  These offenses include knowing violations of 
donor restrictions,101 false statements or declarations to the Commission,102 
and obstruction of investigations.103  Instead, the EC may refer the matter to 
police or prosecuting authorities for investigation. 104   When it becomes 
aware of a potential criminal offense relating to campaign finance or an 
offense “which [the Commission] consider[s] to be so serious that . . . civil 
sanctions may not be an adequate measure, [the Commission] will liaise and 
share information with the relevant authority so that it can consider 
investigating or prosecuting.”105 
 
Although the EC tends to be more aggressive in investigations than its 
counterparts in the United States and Australia, it fails to impose meaningful 
penalties upon campaign finance violators—even those in power.  In 2015, 
the Tory Party consistently exceeded spending limits in campaigns for 
candidates in twenty-nine constituencies, quite possibly tipping the scales in 
the election, 106  leading to a thirty-eight page EC report on the party’s 
campaign finance violations.  However, the Tory Party ignored the EC’s 
investigation almost entirely.  The party took no action to respond, correct 
inaccurate reporting, or make any attempt at restitution.107  Party members 
                                                     
99  Enforcement sanctions, ELECTORAL COMM’N, https://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/our-
work/roles-and-responsibilities/our-role-as-regulator-of-political-party-finances/sanctions (last visited July 
20, 2017). 
100  Id. 
101  Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000, c.  41§ 61(1) (Eng.). 
102  Id. at § 123(4)(a). 
103  Id. at § 13(2). 
104  What we do and don’t regulate, ELECTORAL 
COMM’N, https://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/our-work/roles-and-responsibilities/our-role-as-
regulator-of-political-party-finances/making-an-allegation/what-we-regulate (last visited July 20, 2017). 
105  EC ENFORCEMENT POLICY, supra note 77, at 14. 
106  Ed Howker & Guy Basnett, The inside story of the Tory election scandal, GUARDIAN (Mar. 23, 
2017), https://www.theguardian.com/news/2017/mar/23/conservative-election-scandal-victory-2015-
expenses. 
107  Id. 
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simply argued that the Commission seemed to have found only 
administrative errors in the Torys’ campaign finance activity, 108 forcing the 
EC to file papers with the High Court demanding information for the 
investigation.  Ultimately, the misspent amount—£250,000—amounted to 
less than one percent of what the party spent in total during the election.  
The EC issued its highest-ever fine as a penalty—just £70000—two years 
after the election had ended.109 
 
III. THE NEW YORK CITY CAMPAIGN FINANCE BOARD 
 
The New York City Campaign Finance Board (“CFB”), in contrast to 
its national counterparts in the United States, Australia, and the United 
Kingdom, generally is known as an effective enforcement body.110  As this 
Comment discusses in Part IV, five factors make the CFB particularly 
effective:  independent authority, professional staffing, impasse prevention, 
relative political freedom, and the power to impose serious civil and criminal 
penalties.  An examination of the CFB’s history and structure illustrates that 
effectiveness. 
 
Founded in 1988 after several local corruption scandals,111 the Board 
was established as part of a sweeping series of ethics reforms, including the 
Campaign Finance Act 112  and Question Six, 113  a public referendum that 
                                                     
108  Id. 
109  Id. 
110  Ciara Torres-Spelliscy & Ari Weisbard, What Albany Could Learn from New York City: A Model 
of Meaningful Campaign Finance Reform in Action, 1 ALB.  GOV’T L. REV. 194, 227 (2008) (“New York 
city provides a useful point of comparison . . . because New York City’s campaign finance system is battle-
tested, well structured and large-scale . . . . [T]he system has been modified in response to feedback the 
Campaign Finance Board has given the New York City Council on the system’s day-to-day operations.”); 
see generally Nicole A. Gordon, Options for Continued Reform of Money in Politics: Citizens United is Not 
the End, 80 ALB. L. REV. 83 (2017); PAUL S. RYAN, CTR. FOR GOVERNMENTAL STUD., A STATUTE OF 
LIBERTY: HOW NEW YORK CITY’S CAMPAIGN FINANCE LAW IS CHANGING THE FACE OF LOCAL ELECTIONS 
(2003), http://www.policyarchive.org/collections/cgs/index?section=5&id=230. 
111  Frank Lynn, Donors Tell New York Panel of Disguising Political Funds, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 16, 
1988), http://www.nytimes.com/1988/03/16/nyregion/donors-tell-new-york-panel-of-disguising-political-
funds.html?pagewanted=all&mcubz=0; see also RONALD GOLDSTOCK, MARTIN MARCUS, THOMAS 
THATCHER & JAMES JACOBS, CORRUPTION AND RACKETEERING IN THE NEW YORK CITY CONSTRUCTION 
INDUSTRY: THE FINAL REPORT OF THE NEW YORK STATE ORGANIZED CRIME TASK FORCE 120 (1990) (“In 
hearings before the New York State Commission on Government Integrity, New York City real estate 
developers revealed how they were able to skirt the statutory proscription on corporate campaign 
contributions in excess of $5,000 per year.  Real estate developer Donald Trump stated that his 
contributions to local campaigns in 1985 exceeded $150,000 . . . . Developer Gerard Guterman contributed 
$100,000 to New York City Comptroller Harrison Goldin’s campaign . . . . Robert Pressman and his family 
contributed $15,000 to Mayor Edward Koch’s 1985 campaign through three contributions.”). 
112  N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 3-701. 
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established the Board and passed with 79.8% of the city’s support.114  The 
referendum took a strong regulatory stance; it aimed to encourage 
participation by candidates and small contributors, reduce campaign 
spending, limit the size of contributions, and ultimately open city elections 
to a broader range of candidates.115  Even at its inception, the Board was 
“assigned broad powers to carry out the purposes of [campaign finance law], 
including publicizing the names of candidates violating its provisions” and 
establishing a database of contribution and expenditure information for 
public access.116  The Board was also tasked with creating and distributing 
New York City’s Voters’ Guide.117 
 
Structurally, the CFB is difficult for any one party to control and 
impossible to deadlock.  Tasked with “overseeing the work of the agency, 
mak[ing] public funds and penalty determinations, issu[ing] advisory 
opinions and adopt[ing] rules,” the Board itself is nonpartisan, consisting of 
five appointed members who each serve five-year terms.118  The odd number 
of members prevents deadlocked votes.  Member appointments are 
staggered, with two members each appointed by the Speaker of the City 
Council and the mayor, neither of whom may be enrolled in the same 
political party.119  The fifth member is selected by the mayor in consultation 
with the Speaker.120 
 
Admittedly, this presents a double-edged sword; the mayor and 
Speaker are empowered to stack the CFB with ideologically similar 
members, provided they are not of the same party.  Though the Working 
Families Party is an independent political party, it shares many policies and 
positions with the Democratic Party, ultimately allowing for two similarly-
minded council members to create a voting bloc despite their nominally 
different party affiliations.121  The mayor and the Speaker could load the 
CFB with liberal (or conservative) votes with very little oversight, allowing 
                                                                                                                                                              
113  1 N.Y. CITY CHARTER REVISION COMM’N, REPORT OF THE NEW YORK CITY CHARTER REVISION 
COMMISSION 12 (1989), http://www.nyc.gov/html/charter/downloads/pdf/1986-1988_final_report.pdf. 
114  Id. at 24. 
115  Id. at 44. 
116  Id. at 45. 
117  Id. at 46. 
118  Board Members, N.Y. CITY CAMPAIGN FIN. BOARD, https://www.nyccfb.info/about/board (last 
visited July 21, 2017). 
119  Id. 
120  Id. 
121  Issues, WORKING FAMILIES, http://workingfamilies.org/issues/ (last visited Sept. 29, 2017); cf. Our 
Platform, DEMOCRATS.ORG, https://www.democrats.org/party-platform (last visited February 25, 2018).   
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them to push a regime of increased or decreased enforcement depending on 
their current political agenda. 
 
Members of the Board must be city residents and registered voters, 
and they must not be officers of political parties, candidates for any city 
office, participants in any capacity in any campaign for city office, officers 
or employees of the city, or registered lobbyists.122  Board members do not 
work for the CFB full-time and are compensated $100 per working day.123  
However, the Board is statutorily entitled to employ necessary staff 
members124 who analyze, audit, and publicize how money is raised and spent 
in local elections; educate voters; and make policy and legislative 
recommendations to the Board.125  As of July 2017, the staff consisted of 
seventeen full-time employees. 126   Though the CFB’s specific operating 
budget is not statutorily protected from a budget shutdown, the law does 
protect the funding the Board dispenses and the operation and distribution of 
that funding, ensuring a city government shutdown will not cripple the 
agency’s function.127 
 
The Board’s independent authority is substantial; it has the power to 
investigate matters related to campaign finance law, to require the 
attendance and testimony of any person relevant to investigation, and to 
compel the production of relevant documents and other evidence.128  The 
Board is also empowered to audit and examine all matters related to 
campaign finance.129 
 
Penalties issued by the CFB are significant and public.  Candidates 
whose expenditures exceed statutory limitations incur a fine of three times 
the excess.130  Failure to respond to the Board’s audit reports incurs a fine of 
ten percent of the candidate’s public funds. 131   A candidate’s knowing 
misrepresentation of information to the Board incurs forfeiture of all public 
                                                     
122  1 N.Y. CITY CHARTER REVISION COMM’N, supra note 113, at 45. 
123  N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 3-708(2). 
124  Id. at § 3-708(3). 
125  CFB Staff, N.Y. CITY CAMPAIGN FIN. BOARD, https://www.nyccfb.info/about/staff/ (last visited 
July 21, 2017). 
126  Id. 
127  Ernest Gellhorn, Ben Bycel, Nicole Gordon & Lawrence Noble, Symposium on Campaign 
Finance Enforcement: A Comparative View, 11 J.L. & POL. 1, 8 (1995). 
128  N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 3-708(6). 
129  Id. at § 3-710. 
130  Id. at § 3-711(2)(a). 
131  Id. at § 3-711(2)(b). 
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funds and criminal penalties.132  Further, the Board is statutorily authorized 
to publicize campaign finance law violations.133 
 
The enforcement process in New York City begins in one of two 
ways:  either the Board receives a written complaint alleging a campaign 
finance violation or the Board undertakes an investigation on its own 
initiative.134  The Board may investigate possible violations at any point.  An 
investigation may include a field investigation, issuing subpoenas, taking 
sworn testimony, issuing interrogatories, and more.  No specific evidentiary 
standard is required for the Board to instigate an investigation.135 
 
When the Board believes a violation has occurred, it notifies the 
candidate and treasurer of her campaign of the alleged violation and 
proposes a civil penalty or repayment obligation. 136   This is the only 
opportunity a candidate has to submit information and documentation to 
contest the violation. 137   The Board then considers any submitted 
information to determine the amount of civil penalties.138  The Board may 
also institute conciliation or mediation proceedings for novel issues of law, 
if appropriate.139 
 
The CFB has been effective and aggressive in enforcement from its 
inception.  After then-Mayor Ed Koch signed its authorizing legislation into 
law, the CFB did not hesitate to penalize Koch’s own campaign for 
violations after its first round of investigations and audits.140  Even current 
Mayor Bill de Blasio, who has appointed current Board members, is not 
immune to the CFB’s aggressive enforcement.  In 2016, he was fined almost 
$48000 for improper spending during his 2013 campaign.141  The Board’s 
use of technology is also commendable—all candidates are listed in a 
publicly-accessible enforcement database according to their borough or 
                                                     
132  Id. at § 3-711(3). 
133  Id. at § 3-711(1). 
134  N.Y. CITY CAMPAIGN FINANCE BD. RULES § 7-01. 
135  Id. at § 7-01(f). 
136  Id. at § 7-02(c)(1). 
137  Id. at § 7-02(c)(2). 
138  Id. at § 7-02(c)(4). 
139  Id. at § 7-02(d). 
140  Stephanie Strom, Koch’s Campaign Panel Fined $35,000 for ’89 Race, N.Y. TIMES (May 22, 
1991), http://www.nytimes.com/1991/05/22/nyregion/koch-s-campaign-panel-fined-35000-for-89-
race.html?mcubz=0. 
141  J.  David Goodman, De Blasio is Fined $48,000 for Campaign Finance Violations, N.Y. TIMES 
(Dec. 15, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/15/nyregion/de-blasio-is-fined-48000-for-campaign-
finance-violations.html. 
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district with notifications of whether their disclosure statements are late or 
missing.142 
 
IV.  FIVE FACTORS FOR EFFECTIVE ENFORCEMENT, APPLIED 
 
As revealed in the discussion above, five factors have made the New 
York City Campaign Finance Board notably successful.  Specifically, the 
CFB’s strength comes from its independent authority, professional staffing, 
tiebreaking procedures and impasse prevention, relative political freedom, 
and power to impose serious civil and criminal penalties. 143   The same 
factors that make the New York City CFB so effective, applied on a national 
level, could increase the efficacy of the FEC, AEC, and EC.144 
 
A. Independent Authority 
 
The CFB’s independent authority is significant, particularly for a 
municipal enforcement body.  It has the power to “oversee . . . the work of 
the agency, make public funds and penalty determinations, issue advisory 
opinions and adopt rules,”145 and it is empowered to investigate campaign 
finance law matters.146  In addition, the CFB can compel attendance and 
testimony of any person relevant to an investigation, as well as the 
production of relevant documents and evidence.147  Finally, the Board has 
the power (and staffing resources) to audit any candidate in a local 
election,148 independently impose penalties for violations,149 and to publicize 
those violations.150 
 
                                                     
142  Late/Missing Disclosure Statements, 2017 Citywide Elections, N.Y. CITY CAMPAIGN FIN. BOARD, 
http://www.nyccfb.info/follow-the-money/latemissing-disclosure/ (last visited Sept. 30, 2017).   
143  This list of factors was largely informed by Amanda LaForge’s critique of the FEC in The 
Toothless Tiger – Structural, Political, and Legal Barriers to Effective FEC Enforcement: An Overview 
and Recommendations, and Ciara Torres-Spelliscy and Ari Weisbard’s article What Albany Could Learn 
from New York City: A Model of Meaningful Campaign Finance Reform in Action.  Amanda S. LaForge, 
The Toothless Tiger – Structural, Political, and Legal Barriers to Effective FEC Enforcement: An 
Overview and Recommendations, 10 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 351, 381–82 (1996); Torres-Spelliscy & Weisbard, 
supra note 110, at 237. 
144  Throughout this analysis, I proceed with the assumption that, all else being equal, stricter 
regulation of money in campaigns, more competitive races, and more enforcement of campaign finance 
laws are normatively preferable to minimal regulation, competition, and enforcement. 
145  Board Members, supra note 118. 
146  N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 3-708(5). 
147  Id. 
148  Id. at §3-710. 
149  THE RULES OF THE CITY OF N.Y. §7-02(c)(4). 
150  N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 3-711(1). 
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The United States’ FEC currently lacks the power to conduct random 
audits; rather, it only automatically audits publicly-funded presidential 
candidates.151  Audits of non-presidential campaigns are only permitted for 
cause,152 though reformers argue random audits would serve as a deterrent 
for would-be violators. 153   Reformers also argue that allowing courts to 
review citizen complaints that have been ignored for more than 120 days de 
novo would de-politicize enforcement, granting courts more independent 
authority to apply the law when the FEC fails to act.154  Finally, allowing the 
FEC to petition the Supreme Court for writs of certiorari to appeal civil 
enforcement actions would give the Commission more independent power to 
enforce civil penalties without the involvement of the Department of 
Justice.155 
 
Though billed as an independent agency, the AEC’s power to 
independently enforce the law is quite limited.  While the electoral 
commissioner has the power to bring a court case against parties or 
candidates who fail to disclose donations properly,156 the Commission has 
minimal power to pursue criminal charges.  Instead, the Commission refers 
cases to state law enforcement when it believes a knowing or willful 
violation has taken place and leaves it within the state’s discretion to pursue 
the matter further.157  In other words, the AEC’s independent power rests 
more in redistricting and in the administration of elections than in 
enforcement of campaign finance laws.158  As in the United States, allowing 
the Commission the power to impose criminal penalties independently, 
establish more severe fines, and appeal to the country’s High Court would 
dramatically increase its ability to enforce campaign finance laws. 
 
In contrast, the EC’s independent authority surpasses that of the FEC 
and AEC.  The Commission’s powers include the ability to issue disclosure 
notices, which require disclosure of specific documents or information 
                                                     
151  Gellhorn et al., supra note 127, at 19. 
152  52 U.S.C. § 30111. 
153  See Kenneth A. Gross, The Enforcement of Campaign Finance Rules: A System in Search of 
Reform, 9 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 279 (1991).   
154  LaForge, supra note 143, at 381–82.   
155  Id. at 380–81. 
156  Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 suv-div 315A(1)–(3). 
157  Burton, supra note 54. 
158  See Luke Cooper, Australian Electoral Commission Announces Lower House Will Have 151 Seats 
at Next Election, HUFFINGTON POST AUSTL. (Aug. 31, 2017), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com.au/2017/08/31/australian-electoral-commission-announces-lower-house-
will-have-151-seats-at-next-election_a_23191673/.   
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related to an organization’s expenditures; to obtain an inspection warrant 
when parties unreasonably refuse to disclose documents; to issue 
investigation notices, which require production of documents and 
information related to an investigation; to obtain a disclosure order, a court-
mandated order to produce the same information; and to require an 
individual to obtain a statutory interview.159  The Commission also has the 
power to issue stop notices (similar to injunctions in the United States) to 
organizations engaging in activity it reasonably believes to be damaging to 
public confidence in elections.160  As demonstrated by the Tory election 
scandal, however, without the independent ability to establish more 
meaningful penalties, the EC’s independent authority lacks teeth. 
 
B. Professional Staffing 
 
One of the aspects that makes the New York City CFB effective is its 
professional staff.  Though CFB board membership is not a full-time job, the 
agency itself is driven by staff that serves full-time, giving the Board the 
capacity to audit every candidate.161 
 
In contrast (and appointment issues notwithstanding), the FEC’s 
functionality has been limited in the past by basic funding issues during 
government shutdowns.  In 2013, then-Commission Chairwoman Ellen 
Weintraub was one of only four FEC employees (out of 339) deemed 
essential during a shutdown.  All four were commissioners.162  “I’d literally 
be the one turning the lights on,” she said in interviews during the budget 
impasse. 163   Phone calls, emails, audits, and enforcement cases went 
unattended during the shutdown.164  The staffing shortfall came both during 
oral arguments for McCutcheon v. Federal Election Commission 165  and 
while the Commission itself was shorthanded:  Democrat Ann Ravel and 
Republican Lee Goodman, though confirmed by the Senate, had yet to start 
their terms.166 
                                                     
159  EC ENFORCEMENT POLICY, supra note 77, at 6–9. 
160  Id. at 11. 
161  Gellhorn et al., supra note 127, at 19.   
162  Dave Levinthal, Government shutdown shrinks FEC to just four employees, CTR. FOR PUB. 
INTEGRITY (Oct. 1, 2013, 4:04 PM), https://www.publicintegrity.org/2013/10/01/13492/government-
shutdown-shrinks-fec-just-four-employees.   
163  Id.  
164  Id. 
165  McCutcheon v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 134 S. Ct. 1434 (2014) (finding two-year aggregate limits 
on campaign contributions failed to meet the stated objective of preventing corruption and were thus 
unconstitutional). 
166  Id. 
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Even when the federal government is not shut down, the FEC remains 
underfunded.  Though the Commission’s budget has increased over the past 
decade—funding went from $54.2 million in 2006 to $65.8 million in 2016, 
an increase of almost 18 percent167—that growth is far outpaced by the 
explosion of political spending over the same period.  The federal election 
cycle cost $2.85 billion in 2005–2006; in 2011–2012 it jumped to $6.3 
billion, a 120 percent increase.168  Over the same period, the FEC went from 
385 staffers—372 permanent and 13 temporary—to 338 in 2013. 169  
Individual analysts went from monitoring 200–300 political committees in 
previous years to more than 500 each in 2013.170 
 
The AEC has specified that professionalization of its workforce is one 
of its long-term goals.  The agency’s corporate plan for 2016–2020 includes 
initiatives to professionalize its workforce.171  The agency aims to roll out a 
core skills and capability training program for all AEC staff, improve the 
capability of executive-level agency heads, and better inform all staff of 
their job expectations.172  The AEC plans to improve recruitment, retention, 
and training of employees. 173   It also aims to improve its information 
technology systems via replacement of old and outdated equipment, increase 
desktop and mobile access for staff members, and technology training across 
the agency.174  Those efforts ultimately aim to correct the lack of attention 
paid to violations like the ones in Tasmania, where lobbyists failed to 
disclose large donations and were never penalized.175 
 
Tasked with a wider jurisdiction than its counterparts, the EC in the 
United Kingdom is a much larger enterprise than the enforcement bodies of 
the United States and Australia.  Accordingly, and to its credit, its workforce 
is largely professionalized and the Commission avoids some of the 
understaffing issues that face the FEC and AEC.  With full-time offices in 
London, Northern Ireland, Scotland, and Wales, as well as regional teams 
throughout England, the EC works to make itself available across the UK in 
                                                     
167  Levinthal, supra note 19. 
168  Id. 
169  Id. 
170  Id. 
171  Functions of the AEC, supra note 50. 
172  AEC CORPORATE PLAN, supra note 56, at 9. 
173  Id. at 17. 
174  Id. at 16. 
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person, via telephone, or via email. 176   Salaries and business travel for 
Commission members are also closely tallied and reported,177 and over 130 
full-time staffers worked for the agency in 2016.178 
 
C. Methods of Preventing Impasse 
 
New York City’s CFB has avoided impasse chiefly by eschewing 
even-numbered boards.  Stalemates are rare, partially due to the 
incorporation of minor political parties with similar ideologies.  New York’s 
mayor and Speaker of the City Council each appoint two members to the 
five-person board, neither of whom may be of the same political party.179  In 
his first selection, Mayor Bill de Blasio sidestepped the limitations on party 
members by appointing Naomi Zauderer of the Working Families Party,180  a 
minor political party closely aligned with progressive politics.181  The move 
freed him to select a Democratic-leaning commissioner for his second 
appointment.  Because the fifth seat is filled by the mayor in consultation 
with the Speaker, it is likely Mayor de Blasio will be able to build a strong 
progressive majority on the CFB.182 
 
In contrast, deadlocked votes have crippled the FEC; in fact, some 
allege that Congress designed the FEC to fail, most notably through a 
bipartisan, six-member structure that requires agreement from at least four 
commissioners for substantive action. 183   In a report issued when she 
announced her early departure from the Commission, former Commissioner 
Ann Ravel pointed out that the four-vote threshold had allowed the agency’s 
                                                     
176  Our Offices, ELECTORAL COMM’N, https://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/contact-us/our-
offices (last visited Sept. 30, 2017).   
177  ELECTORAL COMM’N, ANNUAL REPORT AND ACCOUNTS 2016–17 60, 
https://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0007/232864/2016-17-Annual-report-and-
Accounts-English.pdf.   
178  Id. at 67. Adjusted for population, this is proportionally nearly twice the number of employees the 
FEC employed in 2013, the last year for which staffing numbers are readily available. 
179  Board Members, supra note 118. 
180  Editorial, Will Mayor de Blasio leash the city’s campaign-finance watchdog?, N.Y. POST (Oct. 28, 
2016), http://nypost.com/2016/10/28/will-mayor-de-blasio-leash-the-citys-campaign-finance-watchdog/. 
181  New York Working Families, WORKING FAMILIES, http://workingfamilies.org/states/new-york/ 
(last visited Jul. 19, 2017).  Though the Working Families Party has endorsed both Democratic and 
Republican candidates, the party most closely identifies with the labor movement and progressive politics. 
182  Assuming political diversity is normatively positive, the relatively homogenous makeup of New 
York City’s CFB may be considered problematic; however, it has led to the expansion of regulation and 
enforcement, which this comment assumes to be a positive net result in New York. I address the problems 
with national political homogeneity in Part V of this comment. 
183  R. SAM GARRETT, CONG. RES. SERV., THE FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION: OVERVIEW AND 
SELECTED ISSUES FOR CONGRESS R44318 (2015), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44318.pdf. 
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Republican bloc to “delay and dismiss flagrant violations, impose 
significantly lower penalties, and leave major cases without resolution.”184  
She noted that, in 2006, commissioners deadlocked in less than three percent 
of substantive votes in MURs closed that year.  In 2016, that number jumped 
to thirty percent.  Incorporating minor political parties could help to break 
the current deadlock at the FEC.  Appointments to the Board are made by the 
president with the advice and consent of the Senate. 185   By selecting 
commissioners who identify with minor parties, a president could 
theoretically stack the FEC with commissioners sympathetic to his or her 
views on regulation of campaign finance, either increasing enforcement 
dramatically or ceasing it altogether. 
 
Unlike their American counterpart, the AEC and EC are structured to 
avoid impasse.  Rather than appointing equal voting power among an even 
number of commissioners, each Commission empowers its members 
differently, avoiding the FEC’s problems with deadlocks.  In Australia, the 
chairperson, electoral commissioner, and non-judicial member each play 
different roles in enforcing, reporting, and educating the public on campaign 
finance enforcement.186  Accordingly, preventing impasse is not a concern; a 
deadlock cannot occur because decisions are made by individual 
commissioners who manage specific portfolios of responsibilities rather than 
via consensus. 
 
In the United Kingdom, the EC is structured more like a corporate 
scheme than a voting panel; nine to ten commissioners set a working 
strategy and priorities for the EC as an organization, each representing 
specific regions of the UK or political demographics in Parliament.187  The 
Executive Team and staff of the Commission, who are not subject to 
appointments by Parliament, handle day-to-day functions of election 
administration.188  Because a vote by the Commission is not required to 
update a regulation, trigger an investigation, or impose a sanction, impasse is 
not an issue. 
 
 
                                                     
184  RAVEL, supra note 1, at 1. 
185  Leadership and structure, FED. ELECTION COMM’N, https://www.fec.gov/about/leadership-and-
structure/ (last visited Jul. 19, 2017). 
186  Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 sub-div 6(2) (Austl.).  
187  Who we are, supra note 68. 
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D. Political Independence 
 
The CFB is considered a nonpartisan, formidable enforcement body 
that has “angered all four incumbent mayors in office since 1988.” 189  
Though appointed by the mayor and the Speaker of the City Council, Board 
members are from different political parties.  The appointment process 
encourages the inclusion of members from minor political parties, allowing 
for more ideological nuance on the Board than its federal counterpart’s 
traditional partisan voting blocs.  Eschewing partisan appointments also 
ensures Board seats will not remain empty due to partisan delays, as they did 
in 2008 at the FEC.190 
 
In the United States, the FEC’s bipartisan structure presents unique 
challenges when it comes to political independence.  Though the 
Commission’s structure is designed to protect against overly partisan 
influence, Congress’s choice to establish an ostensibly balanced and even-
numbered Commission has been both praised for insulating the agency from 
political influence and criticized for thwarting its effectiveness.191  From the 
beginning, the Commission’s bipartisan structure has made it difficult for the 
FEC to compromise on the most contentious issues and has opened 
individual commissioners to charges of partisan bias.192 
 
In Australia, the three commissioners of the AEC are appointed by the 
governor-general,193 who is himself appointed by the prime minister via the 
Queen. 194   The governor-general then essentially serves as the chief 
executive in the Australian federal government,195 without a prescribed term 
of office.  Appointments to the AEC are made with the advice of the 
legislature in much the same way that the members of the FEC are appointed 
in the United States.196  However, due to the varying duties and levels of 
power among the commissioners, as well as the distribution of responsibility 
among the various levels of the AEC’s administrative structure, the 
Commission is more like a large company tasked with administering 
                                                     
189  Gene Russianoff, Money and Government: Ethics Reform Since 1986: A View from the Sidelines, 
13 CITY L. 1, 1 (2007). 
190  See generally Levinthal, supra note 19. 
191  GARRETT, supra note 183, at 1. 
192  Id. at 7. 
193  Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 sub-div 6(3)–(4) (Austl.). 
194  Governor-General’s Role, GOVERNOR-GEN. OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTL., 
https://www.gg.gov.au/governor-generals-role (last visited Sept. 30, 2017).   
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elections than an agency subject to political influence.  Though it lacks 
insulation from politics, it also does not seem to suffer from paralysis due to 
political influence. 
 
The EC, in contrast to the FEC and AEC, goes to great lengths to 
insulate its individual commissioners from political influence.  Candidates 
for the Commission may not be members, officers, or employees of a 
registered political party; hold relevant elected office; or be named donors 
within the five years preceding their appointment.197  However, the PPERA 
provides that the registered leader of a qualifying party may propose for 
consideration up to four of the commissioners, 198  and each of the three 
largest parties may nominate three commissioners for appointment.199  In 
total, no one party may have proposed more than two of the ten 
commissioners ultimately appointed, ensuring that no more than twenty 
percent of the Commission represents (and is potentially beholden to) a 
single political party.200 
 
E. Enforcement of Civil and Criminal Penalties 
 
The CFB is empowered to impose meaningful penalties on campaign 
finance law violators.  Statutorily, it has audit and subpoena power, both 
before and after an election, and can withhold public funds from candidates 
it believes to be noncompliant.201  It can make civil penalty assessments and 
go to court to enforce them, and often imposes penalties of up to $10000 per 
violation. 202   However, most conflicts are resolved via conciliation, a 
mediation-style dispute resolution process.203 
 
The FEC’s assessment of fines has declined dramatically over the past 
decade.  “In 2006, the Commission assessed more than $5.5 million in MUR 
civil penalties.  In 2016, MUR civil penalties imposed totaled only 
$595,425.”204  Most likely, the deadlocked board and decrease in staffing 
and bandwidth (rather than a decline in violations) contributed to that 
reduction.  In addition, the FEC has the power to refer knowing and willful 
                                                     
197  Political Parties Elections and Referendums Act 2000, c.41, § 3(4)(a)–(d) (Engl.). 
198  Id. at § 3A(1). 
199  Id. at § 3A(3). 
200  Id. at § 3A(5). 
201  Torres-Spelliscy & Weisbard, supra note 110, at 237.   
202  Id. 
203  Gellhorn et al., supra note 127, at 7–8.   
204  RAVEL, supra note 1, at 1. 
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violations to the Department of Justice for criminal prosecution. 205  
However, most cases do not involve personal candidate liability, resulting in 
limited criminal prosecution of campaign finance law violations.206 
 
The AEC has proposed updates to its own regulations that would 
make enforcement easier and penalties more automatic, but the Australian 
legislature’s lack of political will when it comes to campaign finance 
regulation has limited its progress.  Suggestions included the issuance of 
“on-the-spot” penalties and fines for occurrences of late or incomplete 
disclosure forms,207 designed to encourage contemporaneous or continuous 
disclosure. 208   More extreme ideas included empowering the AEC to 
deregister political parties and liquidate party assets as a penalty for 
misleading the Commission,209 an increase in pecuniary penalties,210 or the 
addition of imprisonment as a penalty for repeated or serious offenses.211  As 
of October 2017, none of the Commission’s suggestions had been 
implemented. 
 
In December 2016, the UK’s EC also called for stronger powers to 
sanction political parties found to be in violation of campaign finance 
laws.212  The maximum penalty the EC is empowered to impose is just 
£20000.  Injunctive penalties are also available, and the Commission can 
refer cases to the Metropolitan Police Service for knowing violations.213  
However, even facing multiple violations by the Tory Party during the 2015 
campaign, the EC was only empowered to impose a total of £70000 in 
penalties—less than a quarter of one percent of the party’s overall spending 
that election.214 
 
                                                     
205  52 U.S.C. § 30109. 
206  Gellhorn et al., supra note 127, at 36. 
207  Australian Electoral Commission, Supplementary Submission 19.1, 3. 
208  JOINT STANDING COMMITTEE ON ELECTORAL MATTERS, PARLIAMENT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF 
AUSTL., REPORT ON THE FUNDING OF POLITICAL PARTIES AND ELECTION CAMPAIGNS 181 (2011), 
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V. LIMITS AND CHALLENGES OF APPLYING A SPECIFIC MUNICIPALITY’S 
STRATEGY ON A NATIONAL LEVEL 
 
Translating strategies that make sense on a municipal level, however, 
does not come without its challenges.  The differences in ideological 
diversity and political will between a city and a country make for anything 
but a seamless transition.  New York City’s geographical compactness, 
political homogeneity, 215  and pro-regulation leadership make it the ideal 
home for a campaign finance enforcement commission like the CFB to 
flourish.  Application on a national scale would likely face the opposite 
circumstances:  expansive geography (and with it, political diversity) and 
possible resistance to additional regulation of political spending. 
 
The adoption of a pro-regulation campaign finance regime in New 
York City may have been due to the convergence of three factors:  an 
impetus, political will, and the support of voters.  The CFB only came into 
being after a series of scandals led the public to demand investigations into, 
and laws to prevent, corruption on the municipal level.216  The political will 
to maintain the CFB’s enforcement power was strong, even after Mayor Ed 
Koch, who had signed the Campaign Finance Reform Act into law, became 
one of the first candidates penalized for violating contribution limits after 
overspending in his 1989 primary campaign.217  An overwhelming majority 
of voters passed a referendum creating the CFB in 1988. 218   The City 
Council remains pro-regulation when it comes to campaign finance, and has 
added new legislation and regulation that further reins in contributions and 
increases disclosure responsibilities over a half dozen times since 1996.219 
 
The United States, Australia, and the United Kingdom, in contrast, 
lack the three things that may have made New York City’s campaign finance 
regime so effective.  Though each of the three nations has faced countless 
                                                     
215  The New York City Council is composed of 48 Democratic Councilmembers and 3 Republican 
Councilmembers.  What we do, N.Y. CITY COUNCIL, https://council.nyc.gov/about/ (last visited Sept. 29, 
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into political and governmental corruption growing out of the New York City corruption scandals.”).  
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continuously-unfolding campaign finance scandals in recent years220 (and 
indeed, the implementation of campaign finance regulation was triggered by 
election scandals, particularly in the United States),221 none has used those 
scandals as a catalyst for reform and increased regulation.  They also lack 
the political will to increase regulation on the national level,222 regardless of 
voter support of campaign finance regulation.223  While it may be easy for a 
bill strengthening campaign finance restrictions to survive a city council 
vote for regulation in New York City, where 48 of 51 councilmembers and 
the mayor are Democrats, legislation that strengthens financial restrictions is 
far more difficult to pass on the national level, particularly in more 
conservative legislative bodies. 
 
However, transitioning successful local strategies and laws into model 
legislation for use on a national level is not entirely unheard of outside the 
campaign finance realm.  In 1994, sex offender registries in the United 
States were intended only for use by law enforcement.224   After Megan 
Kanka, a seven-year-old girl in New Jersey, was raped and murdered by a 
sex offender living in her neighborhood, her parents pushed for local laws 
requiring public sex offender registration for high-risk offenders.225  After 
New Jersey Congressman Dick Zimmer, a Republican, sponsored a bill 
based on the state legislation, United States President Bill Clinton, a 
                                                     
220  See, e.g., Joey Flechas & Nicholas Nehamas, He says he quit election for family.  It was actually a 
criminal investigation, MIAMI HERALD (Sept. 26, 2017), 
http://www.miamiherald.com/news/local/community/miami-dade/miami-beach/article175553621.html; 
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59597; Political parties shelve funding reform talks, BBC (July 4, 2013), http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-
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Campaign Spending, N.Y. TIMES (June 2, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/03/us/politics/poll-
shows-americans-favor-overhaul-of-campaign-financing.html?mcubz=0; Joo-Cheong Tham, Eight Ways to 
Clean Up Money in Australian Politics, CONVERSATION (June 2, 2016), https://theconversation.com/eight-
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2014). 
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Democrat, ultimately signed “Megan’s Law,” a federal crime measure 
allowing states to inform communities when convicted sex offenders move 
into the area.226 
 
The successful passage of Megan’s Law demonstrates the three 
factors that may be needed for the passage of state or municipal-level reform 
to be successful on a national level:  a catalyzing event, bipartisan political 
will, and public support.227  Admittedly, strengthening campaign finance law 
enforcement faces an uphill battle when it comes to the latter two factors; it 
is difficult to imagine a legislative body finding the political will to change a 
campaign finance regime that elected them, and campaign finance reform no 
doubt inspires a tiny fraction of the passion the public feels for violence 
against children.  More exhaustive research may indicate easier paths to 
reform.  However, without a catalyzing event, bipartisan political support, 
and public interest, the implementation of stronger campaign finance 
enforcement powers is unlikely to become a priority in the United States, 




The inefficacy of the Federal Election Commission, Australian 
Electoral Commission, and the United Kingdom’s Electoral Commission did 
not come about by chance; rather, it is inherently encoded in each agency’s 
authorizing legislation and enforced by their appointment processes, 
enforcement powers, and exposure to political gridlock.  While the FEC is 
deadlocked by constant impasse, the AEC fails to monitor or penalize 
violations of campaign finance law effectively, and the EC remains crippled 
by insufficiently harsh penalties that fail to deter parties from overstepping 
spending limits. 
 
The New York City Campaign Finance Board, however, remains a 
model of effective enforcement because it has significant independent 
authority, employs professional staff, is structured in a way that precludes 
deadlocked votes, is relatively free from political influence over 
appointments and enforcement, and has the power to impose serious 
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penalties when violations occur.  Though applying those factors on a 
national scale presents its own set of challenges, the FEC, AEC, and EC may 
be made more effective if they implement portions of the CFB’s structure, 
making for stronger enforcement of campaign finance laws in their 
respective election systems. 
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